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Abstract
In a cash−in−advance economy where cash is required in advance of purchasing both
consumption and investment goods, we find that active interest rate rules generate
equilibrium uniqueness, but passive rules can lead to real indeterminacy. Simulation shows
that even in the presence of investment, passive rules are very likely to render indeterminacy.
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The conventional conclusion in the literature on interest rate feedback rules
is that an active monetary policy that ﬁghts inﬂation by raising the nominal
interest rate by more than the increase in inﬂation stabilizes the economy by
ensuring the uniqueness of equilibrium. On the other hand, a passive mone-
tary policy that increases inﬂation by raising the nominal interest rate by less
than the observed increase in inﬂation yields indeterminacy by giving rise to
expectations-driven ﬂuctuations. [e.g., Leeper (1991), Clarida et al. (2000) and
Benhabib et al. (2001a)]
There are recent challenges to these conventional results. Benhabib et al.
(2001a) show that depending on the way in which money is assumed to enter
preferences and technology, an active monetary policy does not necessarily bring
about the determinacy of equilibrium, and that passive monetary policy may.
By appending endogenous investment to a benchmark continuous-time ﬂexible-
price model, Meng and Yip (2004) ﬁnd that equilibrium uniqueness is ensured
regardless of the interest rate policy rules. However, if endogenous labor supply
is considered, then Meng and Yip show that indeterminacy of equilibrium can
be obtained for both types of monetary rules. Nevertheless, the condition for
indeterminacy carries an intuition that the labor demand and supply curves
may cross with wrong slopes.1 Likewise, in an endogenous growth model with
a Clower CIA constraint and endogenous labor supply, Itaya and Mino (2002)
also ﬁnd that in the presence of external increasing returns, indeterminacy can
occur regardless the interest rate rule is active or passive. But as in Meng
and Yip (2004), the indeterminacy conditions oﬀer the same interpretation that
the labor demand and supply curves cross with wrong slopes. In addition, the
magnitude of the external increasing returns required for indeterminacy is not
1Similar ﬁndings are present in the work by Benhabib and Farmer (1994) and Farmer
(1997).
1assessed.
The present note studies monetary policy and multiple equilibria in a cash-
in-advance (CIA) economy where cash is required in advance of purchasing both
consumption and investment goods. We ﬁnd that active interest rate rules gen-
erate equilibrium uniqueness, but passive rules can lead to real indeterminacy.
This provides an alternative, less controversial environment that indeterminacy
of equilibrium can occur in the presence of capital accumulation. Moreover,
we assess quantitatively the likelihood of the indeterminacy condition and our
simulation shows that even in the presence of investment, passive rules are
very likely to render indeterminacy. Finally, corroborating the ﬁndings of Meng
(2002), whether indeterminacy can occur under passive rules depend on, but
n o tt o os e n s i t i v et o ,t h em a g n i t u d eo ft h es t e a d y - s t a t ei n ﬂation rate.
2 A Flexible-Price, Cash in Advance Economy




U (c) e−ρtdt (1)
where ρ>0 r e p r e s e n t st h er a t eo ft i m ep r e f e r e n c ea n dc is consumption. The
instantaneous utility function satisﬁes Uc > 0 >U cc.2 The household may hold
wealth in terms of either capital, money or bonds. The law of motion of capital
is:3
˙ k = i (2)
where i denotes physical investment. The real value of non-capital wealth a
(i.e. money and bonds) evolves according to
˙ a =( R − π)a + f (k) − Rm − i − τ − c (3)
2Uc and Ucc denote the ﬁrst- and second-order derivative of U respectively.
3For simplicity, we abstract from depreciation of capital stock.
2where m is real money balances, R is nominal interest rate and π is inﬂation
rate. Household has perfect foresight and takes price and lump-sum transfer τ
as given. The neoclassical production function f satisﬁes f
0
(k) > 0 >f
00
(k).4
In addition, the household is subject to the following liquidity constraint
c + φ˙ k ≤ m (4)
where φ ∈ [0,1].A c c o r d i n g t o (4), the CIA constraint applies to all consumption
goods and a fraction of investment goods as proposed by Wang and Yip (1992).5
The household then maximizes (1) subject to(2) - (4) and the standard no-Ponzi-
game condition. The optimality conditions are
Uc = λ + ψ (5)
ψ = Rλ (6)
λ + φψ = λk (7)
.
λ = λ(ρ + π − R) (8)
.
λk = ρλk − λf
0
(k) (9)
as well as the transversality conditions associated with a and k, where λ and
λk are the costate variables for a and k respectively and ψ is the Lagrangian
multiplier for (4). Equilibrium in goods market yields
˙ k = f (k) − c (10)
4f0 and f00 denote the ﬁrst- and second-order derivative of f respectively.
5I nt h ea n a l y s i sb e l o w ,w ew o u l dn o ts t u d yt h es p e c i a lc a s ew h e r eφ =0(the Clower CIA
constraint). This is because the equilibrium dynamics of this special case is identical to the
money-in-the-utility-function models. To be speciﬁc, in the Clower CIA model, there exists
a unique perfect foresight equilibrium under both active and passive monetary policies which
coincides with the main ﬁnding of Meng and Yip (2004). The intuition is that these two
classes of models are functionally and qualitatively equivalent as shown by Feenstra (1986)
and Wang and Yip (1992) respectively.
3Following Leeper (1991) and Benhabib et al. (2001a), the monetary author-
ity sets the nominal interest rate as a function of the inﬂation rate, i.e.
R = R(π) (11)
where R(·) is continuous, nondecreasing, and strictly positive and there exists
at least one π∗ > −ρ such that R(π∗)=ρ + π∗.6 We refer the monetary
policy as active if R
0
(π∗) > 1 and passive if R
0





From (5) to (7),w ec a ns o l v e
c = c(λ,λk) and π = π(λ,λk) (12)
where ∂c/∂λ =( φ − 1)/φUcc > 0,∂c / ∂λ k =1 /φUcc < 0,∂π/ ∂λ= −(1 + φR)/φλR0 <
0 and ∂π/∂λk =1 /λR0 > 0. Substituting (11) and (12) into the dynamic equa-
tions (8) - (10),w eh a v e
˙ λ = λ[ρ + π (λ,λk) − R(π(λ,λk))] (13)
.
λk = ρλk − λf
0
(k) (14)
˙ k = f (k) − c(λ,λk) (15)
which characterize the dynamics of the system. Linearizing (13) - (15) around
the steady state (λ
∗,λ
∗





















6The asterisk ∗ denotes the steady-state value of a variable.
7R0 denotes the derivative of R with respect to π.
8We assume, as in Meng (2002), that ﬁscal policy is Ricardian so that the present discounted
value of total government liabilities converges to zero both in and oﬀ equilibrium. For details,
see Benhabib et al. (2001a) and the reference cited therein.







φR0 (1 − R0) 1
φR0 0











The trace and the determinant of the Jacobian matrix is given by:
tr(A)=−
(1 + φR(π∗))(1 − R0)
φR0 + ρ + ρ(1 + φR(π∗)) (17)
det(A)=








According to (18), det(A) > (<)0 if we have passive (active) rules. From (17),
tr(A) > 0 under active rules but is ambiguous under passive rules. Thus, we
can conclude:
Proposition 1 F o ra c t i v ep o l i c yr u l ew h e r eR
0
> 1, we must have two char-
acteristic roots with positive real parts and one characteristic root with negative
real part. The steady-state equilibrium is a saddle and there is no real indeter-
minacy.
Proposition 2 For passive policy rule where R
0
< 1, we either have three char-
acteristic roots with positive real parts or one characteristic root with positive
real part and two with negative real parts. In the latter case, real indeterminacy
is possible.
The intuition behind these results is as follows. Suppose consumption is
reduced below its steady-state level, it follows that the nominal interest rate
has to rise above its steady-state level as well. This in turn pushes up the
shadow price of capital so that consumption falls further. Under active interest
rate rules, the real interest rate also rises which then leads to a decline in capital
stock. This lowers production and reduces consumption further from the steady
9All derivatives are evaluated at their steady-state values.
5state so that such a trajectory is not consistent with equilibrium. On the other
hand, if the interest rate rule is passive, then the real interest rate falls instead.
As a result, capital stock must rise so that consumption will increase and return
to its steady state level. If this income-type eﬀect dominates the eﬀect of the
shadow price of capital on consumption, then the trajectory under consideration
is consistent with the steady state equilibrium.10
In order to investigate further on real indeterminacy under passive rules, we
note that a negative trace is a suﬃcient condition for real indeterminacy in this
case. This suﬃcient condition is equivalent to the following restriction:
R0 <
1+φR(π∗)
1+φ[ρ + R(π∗)+ρ(1 + φR(π∗))]
≡ B. (19)
Notice that the steady-state inﬂation rate aﬀects the nominal interest rate and
hence the indeterminacy result. We then have
Corollary 3 For passive rule, if R0 <B , we have real indeterminacy.
Numerical examples can be constructed as follows. We take ρ =0 .0045.
For the CIA parameter φ, we consider several values ranging from 0.25 to 1.
For the steady-state inﬂation rate π∗, we start from 0 and all the way up to
1000%. The values of B is summarized in Table 1.
(Table 1 about here)
As B ranges from 0.9911 to 0.9978, we believe that it is very likely to have
indeterminacy under passive rules. We also provide the following example for
illustrative purposes. The utility function is the constant intertemporal elastic-
ity of substitution type, i.e. c1−σ/1−σ,w h e r eσ is the inverse of intertemporal
10In the case where the CIA constraint does not apply to investment goods (i.e., φ =0 ),
then only the shadow price eﬀect on consumption is at work so that equilibrium determinacy
occurs regardless whether monetary policy is active or passive. This is consistent with the
main ﬁnding of Meng and Yip (2004) although their analysis is conducted in a money-in-the-
utility-function model.
6elasticity of substitution. In addition, we assumed a simple Cobb Douglas pro-
duction function, i.e.y = AKα,w h e r eA is a constant scaling factor measuring
the productivity of the general capital and α is the capital share.
Example 1. Consider the following parameterization: ρ =0 .0045, R
0
=0 .5,
π∗ =0 % , A =2 ,α=0 .33 and σ =1 .5. In this case, the eigenvalues are −1,
0.0045207 and −4.53548 × 10−7, implying that local indeterminacy occurs.11
4C o n c l u s i o n
In a neoclassical growth model where both consumption and a fraction of in-
vestment are subject to CIA constraint, we ﬁnd that passive rules are very likely
to generate real indeterminacy while active rules render equilibrium uniqueness.
However, we must remind the readers that local equilibrium uniqueness does
not imply global uniqueness.12 Nevertheless, the present paper focuses on the
nature of the CIA constraint and investiagtes the local dynamic properties of
the steady state equilibrium. The global analysis with endogenous investment
awaits for future research.
11It is likely that when R
0
changes across B, the system may experience a Hopf bifurcation.
Such analysis of periodic equilibra of closed orbits deserves further study.
12See Benhabib et al (2001b) for a global analysis on the dynamics of interest rate feedback
rules.
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The column under B (where B is deﬁned below) shows the critical values
for generating local indeterminacy under diﬀerent combinations of steady state
inﬂation rates (π∗) and the CIA fraction parameter (φ). When the policy rules’
parameter is less than the critical value, local indeterminacy occurs. (i.e. when
R
0
<B , local indeterminacy occurs)
Note: B ≡
1+φR(π∗)
1+φ[ρ + R(π∗)+ρ(1 + R(π∗))]
where ρ is the rate of time preference and is set to 0.0045 and R(π∗)=ρ+π∗.
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